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v.
BRINKMAN
1.
case.

SUMMARY:

Cert to CA 6
(Phillips, Peck
and Lively;
per curiam)
Federal/Civil

Timely

This is the Dayton school desegregation

It has three times been up to the Sixth Circuit Court

of App eals and this Court has once denied certiorari (423 U.S.
1000, No. 75-403).

In its first opinion (February 7, 1973),

-

the DC (Rubin) (S.D. Ohio) found limited constitutional violations; he twice ordered limited remedies; after the second
CA 6 remand, Judge Rubin ordered the transporta tion of some

•
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----

15,000 students in order to desegregate the entire Dayton
school system.
district.)

(The system is encompassed by one school

The Board seeks cert from CA 6's affirmance of

the last DC order.
2.

FACTS:

Brinkman I

The DC's first opinion contains the factual
findings that establish the constitutional violation.
\

Since

the 1880's, Ohio law has mandated an integrated school system,

\ but there have been "isolated but repeated instances" of the
Dayton Board's failure to meet the standards of Ohio law.

The

most serious of these violations took place in the pre-Brown

l/

era and were corrected before Brown or shortly thereafter. There was no evidence that the Board manipulated boundaries of
attendance zones or bused students so as either to foster onerace schools or to encourage a racial mix within the schools.
The Board's construction policy was not shown to be "segrega;tive

.

in nature other than to provide schools in white neighborhoods

"':./

- These include pre-Brown practices of (1) se~arating pupils
and teachers by race in one school in the 1920 s; (2) denial to
blacks of access to swimming pools in the '30's and '40's;
(3) exclusion, from 1938-48, of black high school teams from the
city athletic conference; (4) the hiring of few black teachers
before 1930 and hiring blacks who taught only in black schools up
to the early 1950's; and (5) the creation of Dunbar High as a
black high school in 1933. Nos. (1), (2), and (3) ceased before
Brown; hiring ~olicies changed in the 1951-52 school year and by
the early 1970 s (after an agreement with HEW) the percentage of
black teachers in each school roughly reflected the percentage of
black students in the entire system. When Dunbar was created no
attendance zones existed in Dayton; when attendance zones were
established in the post-war period, Dunbar continued as a citywide all-black high school until it closed in 1962.

- 3 -

which remain predominantly white and schools in black
neighborhoods which remain predominantly black," pursuant
to a policy of building schools where the children are.
Id., at 7a.

The majority of optional attendance zones

(overlapping attendance areas permitting a choice between
two or more schools) had no racial significance at the time
of their creation; at least three of four remaining high
school optional attendance zones (including the two largest),
however, did have "adverse racial effects."

Since 1969,

Dayton has had a free enrollment policy, which allows students
to enroll in any school that has room.

--

Students within the

attendance area of the school have first priority, students
meeting the requirements for special programs in the school
have second, and students whose transfer will contribute to
improved racial balance have third priority.

There was no

-.

evidence that black students were denied enrollment in any ,

however, has contributed little to racial balance in the schools.
"The great majority of all schools in the Dayton system today
have student populations which are racially imbalanced, consistent with the black-white population and geographical distribution thereof"; until 1971 no effort was made by the Board

\~1\

to achieve racial balance in the schools.

~~n

Petn. App., at Sa.

1971, ; ; - :even-member Board adopted several resolutions

recognizing the existence of racial segr egation in the schools,
the role played by the Board in the creation of racial pat t erns ,

..

- 4 and the need for affirmative action to eliminate the patterns.
These resolutions were rescinded after two newly elected members took their seats on the Board in the beginning of 1972.
From these findings the DC isolated "racially imbalanced
schools, optional attendance zones, and recent Board action [as]
cUIIII}{ulatively in violation of the Equal Protection Clause" and
therefore justifying court intervention under Brown.
12a.

Id., at

As a remedy the court ordered the abolition of optional

attendance zones, non-racially based faculty assignment and
employee hiring policies, new priorities for the free enrollment
system (first priority to students currently attending a school,
all other places assigned randomly to students seeking admis-

(:

sion); and specialized integrated programs on a city-wide basis.

-

CA 6 accepted the DC's finding of a three-part
'~~------------------------constitutional
violation
but held that the remedy was inadequte

to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.
Brinkman II.

On remand, the DC clarified its .factual

findings and firmly stated that Ohio has not in this century
;

required a dual system

o~

education, and that the Dayton Board

has at no time maintained a dual
~

~

----

:w.------.......,....-.,e:wza~ ~

system~he

...... """t

~

Board did en;age

.. ,

in activities which were segregative in effect.

-

Relying in part

on the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701, et
~·:which

endorsed the concept of neighborhood schools and

limited remedies to correction of particular violations, the DC

. ...._.,

rejected an integration plan to match the percentage of bla ck
white students in each school to the pe rcentage of each race

- 5 -

in the entire system.

Instead, it ordered the closing of

one of the all-black schools (with the students to enroll
in another school of their choice); the development of
magnet schools (some of which would be part-time); the
establishment of racially balanced, mandatory elementary
school science centers; and the perpetuation of the open
enrollment program.

This plan was to be tried for the

1975-76 school year and, if ineffective, to be replaced in
September of 1976.
CA 6 again disapproved the remedy and remanded for
modification of the plan "so as to improve the. racial balance
• • • in as many of the remaining racially identifiable schools
in the Dayton system as feasible."

The DC was further instructed

to develop a system-wide plan for the 1976-77 school year.

CA 6

clarified its prior holding to mean that the Dayton system "has
been and is guilty of de jure segregation practices."
Brinkman III.

On remand, the DC ordered that "as of

September 1, 1976, each and every school in the Dayton School
District will have a pupil population approaching the distr ict
percentage [48% black, 52% white], but deviating no more than

---

15% plus or minus."

The only exception was that students then in

grades 10, 11, 12 were to be permitted to graduate from their
current schools.

The court also allowed that variations from

the specified percentages "by reason of geographic location"
would be considered on an individual basis.

CA 6 affirmed.

- 6 3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the broad

relief is inconsistent with Swann, Keyes, Milliken, and
the EEOA, in that it exceeds the scope of the violations
and it establishes fixed percentages of racial balance.
Petr also contends that the individual plaintiffs in this
action have not shown any constitutional injury to themselves or that they were members of the class that they
claim to represent.

Resps contend that the remedy is

necessary to eliminate the effects of de jure segregation,
that the percentages are merely guidelines and consistent
with Swann, et al., and that petr's standing contentions were
rejected by CA 6 on the first appeal and until now have not
been again presented to any court.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The only colorable claim is the

consistency of the remedy finally approved by CA 6 with this
Court's prior cases.

Resps seem correct in their

assertio~

that

it is a bit late to question standing; and the EEOA claim washes
out if the remedy is tailored to the constitutional violation,
since that Act does not purport to limit the courcs' powers to
remedy deprivations of constitutional rights.
Although the DC did appear to be establishing fixed
ratios for each school, the 15% variance and the opportunity for
further variation where necessary seems to bring the DC's action
within Swann's permission to use ratios as "a starting point in
(

the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement."

402 U.S., at 25.

issue is by itself cert"tvorthy.

It is close, but I don't think the

J

~.

..,..

- 7 The question of the need for such a broad remedy is
more problematic.

Unlike Swann, which dealt with a dual

system, the DC here expressly found that neither the State
nor the Dayton Board had maintained a dual school system.
To be sure, there were limited de jure segregative practices,
but I can find nothing in the DC or appellate opinions suggesting that the practices produced the present state of racial
imbalance in the Dayton schools.

On the contrary, the DC found

the racial imbalance to be "consistent with the black-white
population and the geographical distribution thereof."

Un-

fortunately, the DC made no finding as to what effect the
segregative practices had.

2/

There seems to be no factual basis

for determining whether, as in Keyes, "school authorities have
carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a
substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and
facilities."

413 U.S., at 201.

Moreover, Keyes relied on tpe

"systematic program" as a predicate for finding the existence of
a dual school system, id., but here no matter what the segregative

II

After the first remand, and at the same time that it
established that no dual system existed, the DC cryptically
found:
"Overt evidences of • • •
segregative activities have
been eliminated both by action
of the Board of Education and
by previous Order of this Court
but the effect thereof may not. 11
Petn. App., at 75a.

.~

- 8 practices, the DC expressly found that no dual system had
Contrary to resps' assertion, Resp., at 15

ever existed.

n. 12, citing CA 6 Opinion in Petn. App., at 89a-90a, CA 6

-..

that Dayton has suffered under a dual school

-

system.
It may well be, as CA 6 held, that the first two

remedies ordered by the DC were inadequate to eliminate the
vestiges of whatever constitutional violations had taken place.
It does not follow, however, that a "full integration" remedy
was necessarily required.

The correct course would seem to be

for the DC to determine the effects of the unconstitutional
segregative practices and to shape a remedy that would eliminate
those effectso

3/

CA 6 has, however, suggested, but not yet held, that the DC
should have found other constitutional violations. On the £;rst
appeal the court reviewed the evidence ~rtaining to the aileged
violations in staff assignment, school construction, grade
structure and reorganization, and transfers and transportation.
CA 6 concluded that:
"[A]ppellants have raised
serious questions with resvect to
whether the District Judge s failure
to include these four school practices within the cumn1ulative violation
was supported by substantial evidence.
In view [of our remand on remedy], we
conclude that it is unnecessary at
this stage to ~ass on whether the
District Judge s findings of fact with
respect to these four school practices
is supported by substantial evidence."
Petn. App., at 66a-67a.
Although resps seek support from CA 6's review of other possibly
segregative practices (Resp., at 3 & n. 2; 5 n . . 3; 13 n. 10), they
do not now challenge the refusal of both courts to hold that these
practices amounted to constitutional violations.

- 9 -

This case presents a poor factual record for any
significant desegregation decision.

CA 6's insistence on

a system-wide remedy in conjunction with the DC's silence
on the effect of the violations has left a gap of undeterminable size between the injury and the remedy.

Assuming

that such a gap is impermissible, whether as a matter of constitutional law or equitable remedies, see Milliken, 418 U.S.,
at 753 (concurring opinion of JUSTICE STEWART), the judgment
should be vacated and the case remanded for a factual determination of the effects of the constitutional violations and
the ordering of a remedy that will successfully eliminate those
effectso
It should be noted that the DC's final remedy was to
be implemented for the 1976-77 school year.

The Court of

Appeals (August 16, 1976) and Justice Stewart as Circuit Justice
(August 19, 1976) denied the Board's motions to stay the jyqg.
ment pending the petition for certiorari.

Thus, according to

resps, "the desegregation plan has been implemented as required."
Resp.,atl2.
There is a response.
11/23/76
ME

Kujovich
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Petition
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To: Justice Powell
Date: 12/8/76
From: Tyler Baker
Re: Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, No. 76-539

This memo is intended as a supplement to the cert pool memo
which is a careful and accurate descriptionHX of the papers.
1)

The original DC opinion.

Petn, App., at la.

The DC found that

there was nothing irrational or manipulative about the way that the
attendance zones had been drawn.

Similarly, the court found that the
Wt.r~

site selections for the construction of new schools A._ based on
neutral factors.

In applying the law to the facts, the court noted

that the situation at issue was simply KKIK unlike that in XM«RKKX
southern schools.
2)

Petn, App., at 26a.
DC Supplemental Order of Remedy.AThe DC quite enthusiastically

endorsed the views that you expressed in your concurrence and dissent
in Keyes.

The court noted that some transportation in furtherance of

integration would occur under the Freedom of Enrollment plan with the
new priorities favoring transfers that

~I

would further integration.

The DC also recognized that the KHXM Board had not done as much
affirmatively with its attendance and construction
as it might have done.

MXX~XKK

decisions

The DC held that the XMM affirmative obligation

that you described would have prospective effect.
3)

The first CA opinion.

Petn, App., at 32a.

findings of constitutional violations of the DC.

TheCA affirmed the

It reviewed the

claims of the app'ants regarding other alleged violations, but without
finding that the DC had erred in not finding them to be violations.
The CA appeared simply to defer KXX judgment about those claims because
(I think)
any event.

~

its remedy order would cover the alleged violations in

"In view of our holding in Section V hereof ["Remedy"],

we concludeMXX

that it is unnecessary at this stage to pass on whether

I

the District Judge's findings of fact with respect to these four
( St~J

school lfliX practices isAsupported by substantial evidence."
App., at 67a.

Without much

MIMXH~

Petn,

elaboration, theCA held that

the remedy ordered by the DC was inadequate.
4)

Order of DC.

Petn, App., at 70a.

The DC stated that it

viewed the transportation of students "only as a last resort and only
after careful inquiry has established that no other solution exists."
XX~

Petn, App. at 72a.
5)

Order of DC.

Petn, App. at XXX 73a.

In this order, the DC

sets out its view of the proper approach to a case of this kind.

The

language MIX about equity and tying the remedy to the scope of the
violation sounds as though it was lifted out of our Austin concurrence.
The

EM~

court XKX also stressed the fact that the XMXK Board was

operating in good faith and deserved the chance for its suggestions
to be given a chance.
6)

Second CA opinion.

Petn, App., at 89a.

This is the opinion

that forced the DC to order the sweeping plan now before this Court.
The CA noted that the plan approved by the DC did nothing to

chang~

basic pattern of "one:IDC race" schools.

The

Petn, App., at 93a.

CA ordered the DC to order system-wide remedies.
7)

Order of DC.

Petn, App., at 99a.

adopts the plan described in the cert pool
8)

Third and final

~tKI~

CA opinion.

the

:M:M~

Id. at 96a.

This is the order that
~

memo.
Petn, App. at 118a.

The CA argues that the 15% variance built into the plan in addition to
the "safety valve" exception for exceptional circumstances shows that
the ratios here were no more than a starting point.
what effect IXX

I am not sure, that the

XMRXKXK~

The CA notes, to
&~o~
Board did notAthat

there were anyKX special problems of geography, etc., with cross-district
M«KKI~

busing.

It is important to note that the

guid~lines

adopted

.

-by the DC are much more sensitive to the values that you have MMXX
mentionedA

See Petn, App., at 119a-120a.

XXX Finally, I was surprised

to find that your old friend Dr. Finger was the special master

here~

Id. at 120a.

Discuss ion:
The fact that the DC did not make any particular findings

M~XX

about the effect of the discrimination that it found makes the case
less than ideal, KX because there is no base line of comparision.
At the same time, it is clear that the DC thought that it
the,.. remedy equal to the scope of the violations.

-

,_.;wa:rn~

~

~

setting

The CA certainly did

not attempt to tie its desire for a more comprehensive remedy to

any view of the extent of the violations.

-

In fact, theCA's statement

that, in view of its approach to the remedy, it didMX not need to addresss
the question of the other alleged violations shows rather

XX~

starkly that

it was not IXMXXKH limiting the remedy to the scope of the violations
-----------~------~-----------'----~------_...________,_~--------------------------------,--

I XMIK think that one might have concluaed that the Board was less

than neutral in its choice of construction KX sites for new
The statistics here are quite strong.

schoo~s ~

If such a finding had been MXKHM

made, I think that one could have XX justified some

XXM«X~KRX

transporta-

tion designed to achieve the mix that would have occurred had the
XKKMXI schools been built in places that would have furthered integration.

..
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To: Justice Powell
Date:
From: Tyler Baker
Re: School Cases: 76-539 and 76-458

1/11/76

My view is that the Dayton case is best for your purposes.
It is not perfect, for the reasons stated in my supplementary
memo, but it does provide a forum to consider the proper remedial
standards.

The IndianQpolis case is so

ful~f

issues that a clear

exposition of remedial issues would be less likely.

I think that

it would be better held for the decision in Dayton and then remanded
for consideration in light of that decision and Arlington Heights,
as suggested by Gene.
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MEMORANDUM
TOI

Tyler Baker

FROM I

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE1

March 1, 1977

Dayton Case
The above case will probably be argued the second week
in March or in April.
Give some thought to the question whether we could be
helped by the Library of Congress.

As Charlie can tell you,

we made a request to that Library for information relevant
to Ingraham, and received a helpful memorandum.
Dayton, in addition to involving the "scope of the remedy"
issue, presents - I believe - the "racial balance" issue,
namely, whether Swann either commands or justifies a court
order that every school within a district must achieve a
specified percentage (even within limits) of blacks and whites.
In Pasadena, the Court held that at least it would be
inappropriate to require specified racial balance except
as a starting point for one year.
There may be some scholarly research, or congressional
committee reports relevant to these issues.
Although I am not inclined to get into pedagogical debates,
I would like to know whether there has been any empirical
research as

~o

the impact of extensive busing on educational

'

.

2.
quality, the cost of education, and - possibly - on public
support for schools in terms of supporting tax increases,
bond issues and the . like.
I am inclined to think, subject to discussion with you,
that it might be worthwhile to frame some questions, and
submit them through our libra£ran nto the Library of Congress.
We may produce a "waterhaul" or even a mass of
indigestible and unhelpful data.

On the other hand, there

may be some studies that would be relevant and helpful.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

LFP/lab

4/25/77

To:

Gene Corney

From:

L. F. P. , Jr.

Date:

No. 76-539

April 25, 1977

Dayton

The briefs by the parties seem to be talking
about two entirely different cases.

Resp's brief (I

have some real doubts whether resps have article III
standing) conveys the impression of massive, systemwide
de jure segregation, practiced by the school board for
some 90 years.

The school board's brief concedes only

a single "constitutional violation", and one widely
believed at the time to be perfectly valid:

the use

of "optional attendance zones".
The decision in this case (at least my vote)
seems likely to turn upon the district court's (DC)
findings of fact.

It is here that I would appreciate

your initial assistance.
Using the school board's brief as a starting
point, it conveys - in summary form - the following
situation as to the only relevant findings in the long
history of this case:
The DC found for the school board with respect
to each of the following critical "practices":
"While school practices in the area of
staff assignment, site selection, grade
structure and organization, student

2.

transfers and transportation were alleged
to have constituted the establishment
of a dual system, these practices were
passed upon by the District Judge and
were found free from any se?regative
intent or effect (A. 5-10)! Brief, p. 7.
The DC found only three acts or practices deemed
to constitute "a cumulative violation of the Equal
Protection Clause":

(i) that racially imbalanced schools

existed; (ii) an optional attendance plan; (iii) recision
by the school board of resolutions (adopted by a prior
"lame duck" board) calling for racial balance in the
entire school system.

The school board's brief- at least on the surface rather persuasively disposes of two of these three adverse
findings:
(i)

Racially Imbalanced Schools.

This is said

to have resulted solely from "geographic distribution of
the races' (a demographic rather than a de jure consequence). ~ "
Indeed, the DC apparently found as a fact:
"At no time . • . did defendant maintain
a dual system of education (A. 75)."
Washington v. Davis is cited here for the proposition that proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose - not mere proof of racial imbalance - is required.
Arlington Heights also is cited.

(ii)

Brief 20.

Recision of the 1971 Resolutions. The

.

•.
'

3.

school board argues that a lame duck board, defeated in
the November, 1971, election, passed three resolutions
designed to eliminate all attendance zones, require large
scale transportation of students, and establish racial
balance in "each school in the Dayton system". (Gene:

we

should take a look to see whether this is a fair description
of the resolution.)
In any event, the school board says that the
Circuit Court did not identify the recision as "an
independent constitutional violation"; rather, CA 6 simply
held that "the recision was part of the cumulative violation
since recision alone could not constitute a violation of
the constitution unless there was a duty to take the
action that was recinded."

(iii)

503 F.2d 684, 697.

Optional Attendance Zones.

The school

board states that the finding of constitutional violation
here "is the keystone of the cumulative violations which
the court found to exist".

It is said that without this

finding, neither the demographic racial imbalance nor
recision of the resolution would have constitutional
significance.
Optional attendance zones were created from time
to time in the '50s and '60s.

They permitted a student

4.

residing in a designated zone to attend one of two
schools at his option.

The board states that "standards

of access, safety, school capacity, convenience and prior
patterns of attendance were the criteria governing the
establishment of the optional zones."

Brief at 22.

The board states (and I know this to be a fact)
that optional zones - often called "freedom of choice"
plans - were widely used in most of the big city school
systems during the period in question.

No zone in Dayton

ever excluded anyone from attending any school in the
Dayton system; such a zone provided a choice between two
schools for students living within the boundaries. Brief
at 22.
The school board states that the DC specifically
found that "the majority of the optional zones had no
racial significance at the time of their creation". (A. 8;
Brief 22).

But the DC apparently held that four zones

"may have constituted exceptions to the general rule",
and thattwo of the zones "have had the most demonstrable
racial effects".

The brief then argues that none of

the four suspect zones possibly could have contributed
significantly to either the creation or perpetuation
of desegregation.
Thus, the "bottom line" of the board's argument

'J

5.

is - as you know - that the racial balance remedy ordered
in this case vastly exceeded the relatively minor
violations.

If the school board's perception of the scope
and import of the DC's finding of fact is substantially
correct, the holding of CA 6 is suspect.

The briefs

of respondent and the SG challenge sharply the school
boards views •
I would appreciate your going directly tothe
factual source:

the findings of the DC, which - if any -

were found by CA 6 to be erroneous, and what inferences
fairly may be drawn from these findings.

ee l / / 4 / 27/ 77

TO:

MR . JUSr

FROM:

Gene Corney

RE:

No. 76-539, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman

'G.:

POWELL

BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO

In your memo to me of 4/25/77 you indicated that the parties
seem to be talking about two entirely different cases.

That is

an accurate observation, though I hope in this memo to explain how
it is that the parties have come to differ on the extent of
discrimination .

I will begin by setting out for you in summary

form the findings of the various courts below.

,r,r,r

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(1)

The factual finding with respect to a "cumulative constitutional violation.
The District Court found a cumulative constitutional

violation composed of three elements:

(a)

substantial racial

imbalance in student enrollment patterns throughout the school
system; (b) the use of four "optional attendance zones" intended to
allow some white students to avoid attending predominantly black
schools; and (c) the School Board's rescission in 1972 of the
resolutions passed in late 1971 by its lameduck predecessors--the
resolution had acknowledged the Board's responsibility for the
existing racial separation .
(2)

The factual finding of an "independent" constitutional
violation.
The DC found that the 1972 resc ission of the resolutions

constituted an independent constitutional violation.

(3)

The DC entered several findings of fact adverse to the
---

.,

plaintiffs!

;,a

pt?7M'--~

-

'

(a) ;rhere was no evidence that attendance zones had

been designed or altered for reasons motivated by racial considerations;
(b)

when a middle school program was established in 1971 the

established attendance boundaries had neither segregative nor
integrative effect; (c) with respect to elementary school construction
and site selection, sufficient evidence had not been presented to
show that it was segregative in nature; (d) with respect to high
school construction and site selection, no evidence had been presented
that the Board

failed to use neutral criteria in its choices.

(e) Dayton adopted in 1969 and modified in 1972 a "freedom of enrollment" plan, and the DC found that the plan had been conceived
and operated without discriminatory intent or a racially disproportionate
effect.
(4)

./.7'1

The factual finding~s with respect to historical perspective.
The DC made its factual findings against what it called

-

a "historical perspective" of intentional discrimination.
~

This

included physical separation into separate buildings of teachers
and pupils by race prior to Brown.

There

were.

~
!~

also pre- Brown

restrictions on the access of blacks to athletic facilities and
the city athletic conference.

The physical isolation of students by

...J

•

race
ended prior....__...._
to Brown •
....___..__.._
The Board was found to have followed a practice of racially

__________

-

......__________
discriminatory
faculty assignment until 1952.
,~--------

Under this plan

black teachers were to teach only black students.

This was gradually

eliminated, and by 1969 each school had at least one black teacher.
In 1971 the Board reached an agreement with HEW providing for
faculty desegregation.

j~

~ ( as

Dunbar high school had been intentionally established in 1933
an all-black high school.

It continued to exist as a city-wide

all-black high school until it closed in 1962.
***A NOTE ON THE DISTRICT COURT"S FACTUAL FINDINGS***
I have concluded, after reading all of the opinions in this
case, that the District Court probably misconceived its role.

At

one point, the DC states that "both by reason of the time that has
elapsed and because these [intentionally segregative] practices have
ceased, however, the [prior intentional discrimination] will not
necessarily be deemed to be evidence of a continuing segregative
policy."

In my view, that is the wrong inquiry.

The mere fact

that a school board has engaged in intentionally discriminatory
actions in the past does not necessarily mean that it is currently
engaging in segregative policies.
~

+

But if also does not

necessarily mean that the passage of time eliminates the basis for
relief to the plaintiff class.

Even if there are no current

segregative actions, the DC's role is to determine the "vestiges"
of state-imposed segregation, and to develop a remedy in light of the
violation.

The DC in this case at no point proceeded to determine

the extent of the "vestiges" of prior discr-imination.
One could argue that it is clear that the DC thought it was
setting the remedy

equal in scope to the constitutional

----

violations, and thus it must have concluded initially that the

-

-

__..

"vestiges" did not warrant a systemwide remedy since it did not
initially order a systemwide remedy.
to do that.

But one would have to stretch

It is clear that the DC thought its primary task was

m locate present constitutional violations and to remedy them.

For the reasons mentioned above, I think it unduly limited the
scope of its inquiry, a fact which will hinder this Court's
resolution of the issues.

,f ,f ,f

THE FIRST OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(1)

The CA's view of the cumulative constitutional violation.
CA6 found that the DC's factual findings on this score

were not only not clearly erronesous, but that they were amply
supported by the record evidence.
(2)

TheCA's view of the independent constitutional violation.
CA6 expressly declined to reach this question given its

affirmance of the factual findings with re~t to the cumulative
violation.
(3)

TheCA's views of the DC's findings of fact with respect
to the absence of constitutional violations in other Board
pract~ces.

CA6 sttted that the plaintiffs raised

~

least four

areas in which constitutional violations might be found:

ot~er

(a) staff

assignment; (b) school construction; (c) grade structure and
reorganization; and (d) transfers and transportation.

Although the

OL

found no constitutional violations in these ' areas, CA6 was of the
~

view that the plaintiffJ s on appeal to that

~

court ~raised

serious

we.'~'e.

questions as to whether the DC's
evidence.

findings~

supported by the

But CA6 found it unnecessary to pass on this issue since

it had already affirmed the DC's finding of a cumulative violation.
(4)

The CA's view of the DC's findings on historical perspective.
CA6 noted that the finding with respect to physical

separation of pupils and teachers according to race was not challenged
on appeal.
***A NOTE ON THE CA'S VIEW OF THE EXTENT OF DISCRIMINATION
As I read the CA6 initial

opin~on

in this case, I find

implicit the view that there were serious systemwide "vestiges"
~

of prior state-imposed segregative practices.

See especially the

following passage:
Once the plaintiff-appellants have shown that stateimposed segregation existed at the time of Brown (or
any point thereafter), school authorities "automatically
assume an affirmative duty . • • to eliminate from the
public schools within their school system 'all vestiges
of state-imposed school segregation.'" [citing Keyesj
When such a showing has been made, "racially neutral"
plans which fail to counteract the continuing effects of
past school segregation are inadequate. .

,r,r,r

,

QTHER RELEVANT STATEMENTS IN SUBSEQUENT OPINIONS OF THE DC AND CA
(1)

The second DC opinion in this case noted that the School

Board "had elljCA.j~d. in activities which were segregative in effect
and which did impinge upon the constitutional rights of students in
such system.

At no time, however, did [the Board] maintain a dual

system of education."

The DC also made the following statement:

~·

"Overt evidences of such segregative activities have been eliminated
both by action of the Board of Education and by previous order of
this g0urt but the effect thereof may not."

The DC stated that

these remarks were to be deemed findings of fact whether implicit
or explicated by its previous opinions.

DISCUSSION
FIRST:

The United States, as amicus curiae, takes the position

that a court is not

at liberty to produce a result--racial

mixture in school attendance--merely because that result may be
considered desirable.

The remedy must operate on the violations

and their continuing effects.

As I read the brief of the United

States, it is in agreement with the position you expressed in Austin
that the extent of an equitiable remedy is determined by and may not
properly exceed the effect of the constitutional violation.
is permissible

Busing

where the evidence supports a finding that

I the extent of integration sought

to be achieved by busing would

have existed had the school authorities fulfilled their constituiona~
\ obligations in the past.
SECOND:

The United States concludes, and I fully agree, that

the three-part cumulative violation discussed above does not
support the remedial order entered in this case.
is not itself a violation of the constitution.

Racial imbalance
It is unlikely that

the four optional attendance zones highlighted by the DC would have
had a pervasive discriminatory impact.

The rescission of the

resolution is not a constitutional violation unless it constitutes

a refusal

by the Board to discharge a constitutional duty derived

from a source other than the initial resolutions.
THIRD:

That leaves the question what to do with this case.

The School Board would have us dismiss the case.
respondents would have us affirm.

The plaintiff-

The United States would have us

affirm on the ground that other facts of record--i.e., other than
those of the cumulative violation--establish that Dayton has for
a long time operated one set of schools primarily for whites and
another set primarily for blacks.

The United States suggests that

it is proper for a court rebuttably to presume that those discriminatory
(

practices achieved their full potential as a contributing factor
to the present observed racial imbalance in student attendance
patterns.

At this point the burden should shift to the school

board to show the extent to which racial imbalance would have
eKisted in the absence of the discrimination.

Since the school

board did not overcome that presumption in this case,

they have

not established that relief less extensive than that required by
the order in effect at this time would eliminate the effects of
racial discrimination.
My own view is that it is necessary to remand this case to
CA6.

So far this whole case has centered around a three-part

cumulative violation that cannot support the remedy actually
entered by the DC.

On

the other hand, it does appear that Dayton

e~rud~d --admittedly in the past--in severe discriminatory actions.

-------------

We are presently hampered by the fact that we have no lower court

f~ ~ith ~spec_t

I

to the extent of the effects of the earlier

widespread discrimination.
----.....__

~7

This Court has already recognized that

residential

patterns and the operation of the schools.

Whether

the racial discrimination on the part of the School Board other than
the three-part cumulative violation had an effect on residential
patterns which has in turn further contributed to racial imbalance
in these schools is a factual matter.
complex.

It is tough and it is

And I can't see any reason for this Court to untangle the

whole thing in the first instance.
I would therefore

dispose of the case as

follows~

First,

I would make it clear that there must be a relationship between the
constitutional violation and the remedy, and that in this case we
can say for sure that the three-part constitutional violation does
e.v .·d~

not justify this remedy.

Second,

~

has been presented indicating

that the Board engaged in serious and widespread discrimination for
a considerable period of time.

It is necessary to sort out the

continuing effects of this discriminatory history.
court has focused on this aspect of the case.

So far no lower

The case is therefore

remanded for consideration of those issues.
Third, this leaves the question as to whether the DC's order
should remain in effect pending this further consideration.

Three ~

,

factors prompt me to conclude that the order should remain in effect.
First, Dayton had engaged in serious racial discrimination, and there
are surely some continuing widespread effects.

Second, the plan

has already been put into operation, and it may be best not to upset
the applecart until the final results are in.

e ...... +-.-..ll~

Third, there is a

good chance that CA6 will l conclude that this particular remedy is
justified.

As I noted earlier, it stressed that there were serious

problems with the DC's findings of fact as to the absence of

present discrimination in such areas as construction.
be free on remand to re-examine those DC findings.

It will

And it will

undoubtedly rely more explicitly on the present effects of prior
school board discrimination.

. ·'

ec///

4/28/'-

SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMO IN THE DAYTON SCHOOL CASE
The DC ordered the School Board to present a plan that
would accomplish the following;
Abolish all optional attendance zones presently remaining within the Dayton school system;
.1(2)

Restate the priorities for high school atl.endance
in the freedom of enro1lment plan in order that no
student of a minority race may be denied attendance at any high school in the Dayton Public
School System and so that transfers for purpose of
improving racial balance take precedence over curriculum transfers;
f.-!aintain faculty assignment policies that will reflect in each school the approximate ratio of black
to white faculty throughout the district.
Establish hiring policies that will enable the clerical
and maintenance personnel hired by the school
board of Dayton to approximate the proportion of
black-to-white ratio of the Dayton School District.

The School Board submitted the following plan•
I. Elimination of Optional Zones - eliminated optional
attendance zones for elementary and high school
students.
Freedom of Enrollment Priorities - revised the sjy tem's Freedom of Enrollment program in accordance with a specified set of priorities.
Faculty Assignment Practices - provided that faculty assignments for each school in the system
should reflect the ratio of white to black faculty in
the entire system.
IV. Hiring Policies for Classified Personnel - provided
that blacks would be hired for classified positions,
e.g. clerical, custodial and food service staff, to
reflect the proportion of the black-to-white population residing within the Dayton School Disll:iet.
V. Science Environmental Progr~m - proposed the
establishment of a city-wide elementary science
program guided by a trained staff working at four
centers. The program was to be mai1datory and
children were to be bused to produce a racial mix
that approximates the ratio between black and
white students in the system as a whole.

~
'~ ~

3 ;,

~~·A..

~~-,~~

~

f}tJ. ~

VI. Patterson-Slivers Vocational High School - combined two existing vocational schools into a new
unified cooperative school with a district-wide attendance area.
VII. The Musical Stereopticon - formed an elementary
and high school band orchestra and chorus on an
all-city basis.
VIII. Integrated Athletics - required schools that have no
minorities on their teams to schedule schools that
do have minorities represented. Iligh school schedules were to be administered by a central athletic
office to insure that racial isolation did not exist.
IX. Minority Language Program - required all class·
room teachers and administrators at the elementary
school level to participate in a series of in-service
workshops on linguistic differences that exist in
American English.
X. Living Arts Center - created departments in art,
creative writing, dance and drama to pennit studets, teachers, and parents to expand their knowledge in these areas.
XI. Control Centers - created rumor control centers,
school guidance centers, and area learning centers
to create a more secure c1imate for quality education in the school system.

The DC APPROVED Parts I, III, and IV.

The DC expressed
"

its "disappointment" with the limited nature of Parts V through. XI
(but of course these later Parts were not mandated by the initial
court order).

The DC DISAPPROVED Part II and directed the

School Board to achieve the following:

Any student eligible to attend a Dayton public high
school may attend any high school within the Dayton Public School district, provided that students
presently enrolled in high schools shall have first
priority to complete their education therein.

(2)

I

I

I

(3)

\... (4)

Each incoming ninth grade class and all vacancies
in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth grade classes
shaH be filed from those pupils seeking admission.
Where there is insufficient capacity for all pupils
seeking admission, a random selection plan shall be
used.
Only insufficient capacity shall be deemed reason
to exclude any applying pupil.
Transportation shall be the responsibility of the
Board of Education for all students eligible and
approved for transfer outside of the attendance
area of such students' residences.
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Rider A, p. 24 (Dayton)
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In view of the confusion at various stages in this case,
evident from the opinions both of the Court of Appeals and
the District Court, as to the applicable principles and
appropriate relief, the case must be remanded to the District
Court for the taking - of additional evidence and the making of
more specific findings.
If the only deficiency in the record before us was the
failure of the Court of Appeals to pass on respondents'
assignments of error respecting the initial rulings of the
District Court, it would be appropriate to remand the case
to that court, but we think it evident that supplementation
of the record will be necessary.

Apart from what has been

said above with respect to the use of the ambiguous phrase
"cumulative violation" by both courts, the disparity between
the evidence of constitutional violations and the sweeping
remedy finally decreed requires supplementation of the record
and additional findings addressed specifically to the scope
of the remedy.

It is clear, in any event, that the presently

mandated remedy requiring racial balance of every school
within 15% is wholly without support in the record before
us.
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

May 26, 1977

No. 76-539

Dayton

Dear Bill:
Thank you for the opportunity to take a look at your
draft opinion on May 23. I will be glad to join the opinion
when it is circulated. Meanwhile, I understand that it is
undergoing the usual editing, and I have indicated in pencil
some suggested changes. In addition, I make the following
observations:
1. Although I agree that the performance of CA6 was
eccentric (to say the least), I doubt the wisdom of coming
down on it quite so hard. I would not, for example, elevate
the conduct of CA6 to the importance of the substantive
issue before us. See p. 2, 3. Perhaps you have in mind
John's thought that we should give CA6 .an opportunity to
clarify the findings, rather than require a remand to the
District Court. But I believe you make a wholly convincing
case for the necessity of more specific findings by the
District Court.
2. The draft is not entirely clear as to the sequence,
and result, of the various appeals. I suppose you have in
mind adding, near the beginning of the opinion, a brief review
of the history of this case, stating how it reached us and
identifying specifically the issues before us.
3. As you point out, the District Court made only three
ultimate findings of constitutional violation: racially
imbalanced schools, optional attendance zones, and rescission
of the lame-duck school board resolution. These were then
described as a "cumulative violation" of the Equal Protection
Clause. While this phrase is ambiguous, I believe at least
five of us at the Conference thought that only the "optional
attendance zones" violation had legal significance. The

,

- 2 -

mere existence of racially imbalanced schools proves nothing,
as this is a condition that exists in every major city in
the United States where there is a black or Chicano population.
Nor, is the rescission of the board resolution in itself a
violation - ' as CA6 recognized. Thus, on the present record,
the only identifiable constitutional violation relates to the
optional ·attendance zones for two or three high schools.
Even as to these, there was full freedom of choice, and the
zones may well have been created at a time when lower court
decisions supported freedom of choice as a permissible remedy.
It was not until Green (1968) that this Court clarified its
position on this remedy.
In any event, you may wish to consider a narrowing of
the focus with the view to concluding that - on the present
record and in view of the ambiguity - the only arguable violation is the creation and maintenance of optional zones. On
the record before us, there appears to be no justification
for any remedial action with respect to other schools in the
system. Indeed, if the history of this case were not so
confused and if one had greater confidence in exactly what
the courts below have found and held, I would vote for a flat
reversal, and direct the District Court to confine the remedy
to the consequences of the high school zones.
4. You make rather sparing use of the desegregation
case authority. There are some views expressed in Swann that
may be worth quoting, for example:
"The task [in formulating appropriate remedies]
is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and
collective interests, the condition that offends the
Constitution." p. 16.

" • • • it is important to remember that judicial
powers may be exercised only on the basis of a
constitutional violation. Remedial judicial
authority does not put judges automatically in
the shoes of school authorities whose powers are
plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local
authority defaults." p. 16.

"As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy. In default

- 3 by the school authorities of their obligation to
proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has
broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure
a unitary school system." p. 16.

" • • • it should be clear that the existence of
some small number of one-race, or virtually onerace schooli within a district is not in and of
itself the mark of a system that still practices
segregation by law." p. 26.
One can, of course, find just about anything he wants
in the rambling, "paste-pot" opinion in Swann. Also, it is
necessary to remember that Swann was addressing the
traditional segregated school system that prevailed widely
in the South. In the case before us, the District Court
expressly found - as I recall - that no such system had
existed
in Dayton for many years, if ever. Thus, the
Swann language about a "unitary system" and the Green
language about "root and branch" are inapposite.
As the central issue in this case is the appropriateness
of the remedy ordered by CA6, I would make quite clear - by
reference to what we have said in prior cases - that the
nature and scope of the remedy are determined and limited
by the constitutional violations found to exist. Of course,
by their nature, the remedial powers of a court of equity
are broad, but they may not reach beyond the outer boundaries
of the violation that invokes equitable relief.
In addition to the language in Swann, this point was
addressed in Milliken, and in Potter's opinion in Hills v.
Gautreaux. Also, you may find some relevant langauge in
the little opinion I wrote on the remand of the Austin School
case~
You would know better than I whether Pasadena - which
you cite - merits quotation.
5. I have dictated a rider for your consideration, that
might be the basis for some revision of pages 24 and 25 of
the draft. You are summarizing there the reasons for the
taking of additional evidence and the making of more specific
findings by the District Court. I think there are more
fundamental reasons than the mere ambiguity of the phrase
"cumulative violation". As indicated above, in view of the
almost negligible specific findings of constitutional violation,

- 4 we are giving the respondents (the original plaintiffs) the
benefit of doubt by allowing the record to be reopened for
further evidence and additional findings.
I am sending a copy of this memo to Potter, and will be
happy to confer with either or both of you on this or any
subsequent draft.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

Mr. Justice Stewart
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 26, 1977

Re:

No. 76-539 - Dayton

Dear Lewis:
Herewith are my immediate reactions to your letter
of May 26th respecting proposed changes in the draft
opinion~

I called you a moment ago, but you were

temporarily tied up, and since I still do not feel
quite up to spending a full day in the office after
Conference I had planned to leave early this afternoon.
I am therefore sending you this in writing, with the
thought that you, Potter, and I can get together for
any sort of discussion that is needed at our mutual
convenience tomorrow.

If the occasion should arise,

I will be home at any time after four o'clock today,
and would be more than happy to talk about the matter
by telephone.

•

- 2 As to paragraphs two and four of your letter,
I will have no trouble at all in accommodating them.
I had sent the draft to the printer a couple of days
ago, after having received Potter's suggestions, in
order to avoid the final backup, but will suggest
proposed changes in accordance with these paragraphs
which will go in a second draft.
With respect to paragraph thre e, I agree entirely
with its thrust, but thought that I had pretty well
said just that in the present draft.

If it were not

for the respondent's contentions which were never
considered by the Court of Appeals I, too, could vote
for a flat reversal, and direct the District Court to
confine the remedy to the consequences of the high
school zones.
With respect to paragraph five, I think the
substance of your proposal is probably an improvement
on mine, and would like to try my hand at some
modifications of yours to use as a substitute for
my present language on pages 24 and 25.
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[June -, t977]
MR. JusTICE REHNQUtST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This school desegregation action comes to us after five years
and two round trips through the lower federal courts. 1 Those
This action was filed on April 17, 1972, by parents of black children
attending school· opemtcd by the defendant Dayton Board of Education.
After a.n expedited hearing bet.ween November 13 and December 1, 1972,
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, on February 1, 1973,
rendered findings of fact and conclu ions of law directing the formulation
of a desegregation plan. App., at 1. On July 13, 1973, that court
approved, with certain modifications a plan propo1>'1?d by the School Board.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that court
affirmed the findings of fa.ct but reversed and remanded as to the proposed
remedia.l plan. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F. 2d 684 (CA6 1974) .
The District Court then ordered the submis ion of new plans by. the
Board aJld by any other interested parties. App., at 70. On March 10,
1975, it rejected a plan proposed by the plaintiffs, and, with some modifi~
cations approved the Board's plan as modified a.nd expanded in an effort to
comply with the Court of Appeals mandate. App., at 73. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals again reversed as to remedy and directed that
the District Court "a.dopt a system-wide plan for the 1976-1977 school
year . . . ." Brinkman v. Gilligan, 518 F. 2d 853 (CA6 1975).
Upon this second remand, the District Court, on December 29, 1975,
ordered formulation of the plan whose terms are developed in text. App.,
at !}9. On March 25, 1976, the details of the plan were approved by the
District Court. App., at 110. In the decision now under review, the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 539 F. 2d 1084 (CA6
1976).
1
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protracted proceedings have been devoted to the formulation
of a remedy for actions of the Dayton Board of Education
found to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the decision now under review,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit finally approved a
plan involving districtwide racial distribution requirements,
after rejecting two previous less sweeping orders by the District Court. The plan required, beginning with the 19761977 school year, that the racial distribution of each school
in the district be brought within 15% of the 487'o-52o/o blackwhite population ratio of Dayton. 2 As finally formulated, the
plan employed a variety of desegregation techniques, including the "pairing" 3 of schools, the redefinition of attendance zones, and a variety of centralized special programs and
"magnet schools." We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (Jan.
17, 1976), to consider the propriety of this court-ordered
remedy in light of the constitutional violations which were
found by the courts below.
Whatever public notice this case has received as it wended
2 The court said that it would deal on a case-by-ca~e basis with fajlures
to bring individual schools into compliance with this requirement. It. also
ordered that. students already enrolled in the tenth Rnd eleventh grades be
allowed to finish in their present high schools, a.nd announced the following
"guidelines" to be followed "whenever possible" in the case of elementary
school students:
"1. Students may attend neighborhood walk-in schools in those neighborhoods where the schools already have the a.pproved ratio;
"2. Students should be transported to the nearest available school;
"3. No student should be transported for a period of time exceeding
twenty (20) minutes, or two (2) miles, whichever is shorter." App.,
at 104.
a "Pairing" is the designation of two or more schools with contrasting
racial composition for an exchange program where a large proportion of
the students in ea.ch school attend the paired school for some period. In
the plan adopted by the District Court, it was the primary remedy used
in the case of elementa.r y schools.
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its way from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio to this Court has been due to the fact that it
represented an effort by minority plaintiffs to obtain relief
from alleged unconstitutional scgre~ation of the Dayton public
schools said to have resulted from actions by the respondent
School Board. While we would by no means discount the
importance of this aspect of the case, we think that the case
is every bit as important for the issues it raises as to the
proper allocation of functions between the District Courts
and the courts of appeals within the federal judicial system.
Indeed, the importance of the judicial administration aspects of the case arc heightened by the presence of the substantive issues on which it turns. The proper observance of
the division of functions between the federal trial courts and
the federal appellate courts, is important in every case. It
is especially important in a. case such as this where the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio was not simply asked
to render judgment in accordance with the law of Ohio in
favor of one private party against another; it was asked by
the plaintiffs, students in the public school system of a large
city, to restructure the administration of that system.
There is no doubt that federal courts have authority to grant
appropriate relief of this sort when constitutional violations
on the part of school officials are proven. Keyes v. School
District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U. S. 189 ( 1973); Swann
v.Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1
(1971); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451
( 1973). But our cases have just as firmly recognized that
local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 741-742 (1974); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. I, 50 ( 1973);
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, supra, at 469 (1972).
It is for this reason that the case for displacement of the local
authorities by a. federal court in a. school desegration case must
be satisfactorily established by factual proof and justified by

J
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a reasoned statement of legal principles. Cf. Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976).
The lawsuit was begun in April1972, and the District Court
filed its original decision on February 7, 1973. The District
Court first surveyed the past conduct of affairs by the Dayton
School Board, and found "isolated but repeated instances of
failure by the Dayton School Board to meet the standards of
the Ohio law mandating an integrated school system." 4 It
cited instances of physical segration in the schools during the
early decades of this century, 5 but concluded that "[b]oth by
reason of the substantial time that had elapsed and because
these practices have ceased, however, the foregoing will not
necessarily be deemed to be evidence of a continuing segregative policy."
The District Court also found that as recently as the 1950s,
faculty hiring had not been on a racially neutral basis, but that
"by 1963, under a policy designated as one of 'dynamic
gradualism,' at least one black teacher had been assigned to
all eleven high schools and to 35 of the 66 schools in the entire
system." It further found that by 1969 each school in the
Dayton system had an integrated teaching staff consisting
of at least one black faculty member. The Court's conclusion with respect to faculty hiring was that pursuant to a 1971
agreement with the Department of HEW, "the teaching staff
of the Dayton public schools became and still remains substantially integrated." 6
The court pointed out that since 1888, Ohio law as const.rued by its
Supreme Court has forbidden separate public schools for black and white
children. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.48; Board of Education v. State,
45 Ohio St. 555 ( 1888).
5 "Such instances include a physical segregation into separate buildings
of pupils and teachers by race at the Garfield School in the ea.r]y 1920's,
a denial to blacks of access to swimming pools in the 1930's and 1940's
and the exclusion, between 1938 and 1948, of black high school teams from
the city athLetic conference." App., at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
6 The court also considered employment of nonteaching personnel, and
4
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The District Court noted that Dunbar High School had
been established in 1933 as a black high school, taught by
black teachers and attended by black pupils. At the time of
its creation there were no attendance zones in Dayton and
students were permitted liberal transfers, so that attendance
at Dunbar was voluntary. The court found that Dunbar
continued to exist as a citywide all-black high school until it
closed in 1962.
Turning to more recent operations of the Dayton public
schools, the District Court found that the "great majority"
of the 66 schools were imbalanced and that, with one exception,7 the Dayton School Board had made no affirmative
effort to achieve racial balance within those schools. The
court stated that there was no evidence of racial discrimination in the establishment or alteration of attendance bound-·.
aries or in the site selection and construction of new schools .
and school additions. It considered the use of optional attendance zones 8 within the District, and concluded that in the .
majority of cases the "optional zones had no racial significance .
at the time of their creation." It made a somewhat ambigu- ~
ous finding as to the effect of some of the zones in the past,9
a!1d concluded that although none of the elementary optional
school attendance zones today "have any significant potential
effects in terms of increased racial separation," the same canobserved that blacks made up a proportion of the nontea.ching, nonad~
ministrative personnel equal to the proportion of black students in· the ,
District, though in certain occupations they were represented at a sub- .
stantially lower rate.
7
The court noted that a concerted effort had been made in the past
f!:)W years to enroll more black students at the Patterson Co-op High
School.
8 An optional zone is an area between two attendance zones, the
st,udent residents of which are free to choose which of the two schools
they wish to attend.
, 9 The District Court found that three high school optional zones "may
have" had racial significance at the' time of their creation.
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not be said of the high school optional zones. Two zones in
particular, "those between Roosevelt and Colonel White and
between Kiser and Colonel White, are by far the larg0st in
the system and have had the most demonstrable racial effects
in the past." 10
The court found no evidence that the District's "freedom
of enrollment" policy had "been unfairly operated or that
black students [had] been denied transfers because of their
race." Finally the court considered action by the Board on
January 3, 1972, rescinding resolutions, passed by the previous Board, which had a.cknowledged a role played by the
Board in the creation of segregative racial patterns and had
called for various types of remedial measures. The District
Court's ultimate conclusion was that the "racially imbalanced
schools, optional attendance zones, and recent Board action ...
are cumulatively a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."
The District Court's use of the phrase "cumulative violation" is unfortunately not free from ambiguity. Treated most
favorably to the respondents, it may be said to represent the
District Court's opinion that there were three separate although relatively isolated instances of unconstitutional action
on the part of petitioners. Treated most favorably to the
petitioners, however, they must be viewed in quite a different
light. The finding that the pupil population in the various
Dayton schools is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of
showing intentionally segregative actions on the part of the
Board. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976).

~-

Tho following information about those zones is contained in an
appendix to the Dist-rict Court opinion:
% black population
High Schools
Date of Creation
At date of creation 1972-73
31.5
100.0
Roosevelt/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1951
Colonel White extended. . 1958
54.6
0.0
2.7
9.8
Kiser/ . .. . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . 1962
Colonel White ......... .
1.1
54.6
10
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The District Court's finding as to the effect of the optional
attendance zones for the three Dayton high schools, assuming
that it was a violation under the standards of Washington v.
Davis, supra, appears to be so only with respect to high
school districting. Swann, supra, 15 ( 1971). The District
Court's conclusion that the Board's recision of previously
adopted school board resolutions was itself a constitutional
violation is also of questionable validity.
The Board had not acted to undo operative regulations affecting the assignment of pupils or other aspects of tho management of school affairs, cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S.
369 ( 1967) , but simply repudiated its earlier resolution stating that it recognized its own fault in not taking affirmative
action at an earlier date. We agree entirely with tho Court
of Appeals' treatment of this latter action of the Board,
wherein that court said:
"The question of whether a recision of previous Board
action is in and of itself a violation of appellants' constitutional rights is inextricably bound up with the question of whether the Board was under a constitutional
duty to take the action which it initially took. Cf.
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1960); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). If the Board was
not under such a duty, then the recision of the
initial action in and of itself cannot be a constitutional
violation. If the Board was under such a duty, then
the recision becomes a part of the cumulative violation,
and it is not necessary to ascertain whether the recision
ipso facto is an independent violation of the Constitution." 503 F. 2d 684-697.
Judged most favorably to the petitioners, then, the District
Court's findings of constitutional violations amounted to very
little under our decided cases. Nor is light cast upon the
District Court's findings by its repeated use of the phrase
"cumulative violation." We ~ize, of course, that the task
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of factfinding in a case such as this is a good deal more difficult than is typically the case in a more orthodox lawsuit.
Findings as to the motivations of multimembered public
bodies are of necessity difficult, cf. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 45
L. W. 4073 (Jan. 11, 1973), and the question of whether demographic changes resulting in racial concentration occurred
from purely neutral public actions or were instead fostered
by actions which appeared neutral on their face but were in
fact invidiously discriminatory is not an easy one to resolve.
We think it accurate to say that the District Court's formulation of a. remedy on the basis of the three part "cumulative violation" was certainly not based on an unduly cautious
understanding of its authority in such a situation. The
remedy which it originally propounded in light of these findings of fact included requirements that optional attendance
zones be eliminated, and that faculty assignment practices and
hiring policies with respect to classified personnel be tailored
to achieve representative racial distribution in all schools. 11
The one portion of the remedial plan submitted by the
School Board which the District Court refused to accept
without change was that which dealt with so-called "freedom
Tho District Court's first plan also contained the following provi10ions:
"(V) Establishment of four city-wide elementary science center the
·enrollment of which would approximate the existing black-white ratio of
students in tho system;
"(VI) Combination of two high schools into a unified cooperative school
with district-wide attendanre areas;
"(VII) Formation of clem0ntary and high school all-city bands, orchestras and choruses;
"(VIII) Provisions for clwduling of int.egrated athletics;
"(IX) Establishment of a minority language program for education of
staff;
"(X) Utilization of the Living Arts C0nter for inter-racial experiences
in art, creative writing, dance and drama;
"(XI) Creation of oenters for rumor control, school guidance and area
learning."
11
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of enrollment priorities." The court ordered that, as applied
to high schools, new students at each school be chosen at
random from those wishing to attend. 12 The Board was required to furnish transportation for all students who chose to
attend a high school outside the attendance area of their
residence.
Both the plaintiffs and the defendant School Board appealed the order of the District Court to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 503 F. 2d 684. That
court considered at somewhat greater length than had the
District Court both the historical instances of alleged racial
discrimination by the Dayton School Board and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Board's resolutions
and the subsequent recision of those resolutions. This consideration was in a purely descriptive vein: no findings of fact
made by the District Court were reversed as having been
clearly erroneous, and the Court of Appeals engaged in no
factfinding of its own based on evidence adduced before
the District Court. The Court of Appeals then focused on
the District Court's finding of a three-part "cumulative" constitutional violation consisting of racially imbalanced schools,
optional attendance zones, and the recision of the Board resolutions. It found these to be "amply supported by the
evidence."
Plaintiffs in the District Court, respondents here, had crossappealed from the order of the District Court, contending
that the District Court had erred in failing to make further
findings tending to t3how segregative actions on the part of
the Dayton School Board, but the Court of Appeals found
it unnecessary to pass on these contentions. The Court of
Appea.ls also stated that it was unnecessary to "pass on the
question of whether the recision [of the Board resolutions] by
itself was a violation of "constitutional rights." It did discuss
12 The court thi.1s eliminated a provision within the Board plan which
gave first priority to students residing within the schools attendance zone.

76-539-0PINION
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at length what it described as "serious questions" as to whether
Board conduct relating to staff assignment, school construction, grade structure and reorganization, and transfers and
transportation, should have been included within the "cumulative violation" found by the District Court. But it did
no more than discuss these questions; it neither upset the
factual findings of the District Court nor did it reverse the
District Court's conclusions of law.
Thus the Court of Appeals, over and above its historical discussion of the Dayton school situation, dealt and upheld only
with the three-part "cumulative violation" found by the District Court. But it nonetheless reversed the District Court's
approval of the school board plan as modified by the District
Court, because the Court of Appeals concluded that "the
remedy ordered ... is inadequate, considering the scope of
the cumulative violations." While it did not discuss the
specifics of any plan to be adopted on remand, it repeated the
admonition that the court's duty is to eliminate "all vestiges
of state-imposed school segregation." Keyes, supra, at 202;
Swann, supra, at 15.
Viewing the findings of the District Court as to the threepart "cumulative violation" in the strongest light for the
respondents, the Court of Appeals simply had no warrant in
our cases for imposing the systemwide remedy which it apparently did. There had been no showing that such a
remedy was necessary to "eliminate all vestiges of the stateimposed school segregation." It is clear from the findings of
the District Court that Dayton is a racially mixed community, and that many of its schools are no·t either predominantly
white or predominantly black. This fact without more, of
course, does not offend the Constitution. Spencer v. Kugler,
404 U. S. 1027 ( 1972); Swann, supra, at 24. The Court of
Appeals seems to have viewed the present structure of the
Dayton school system as a sort of "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
since some of the racial imbalance that presently obtains may
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have resulted in some part from the three instances of seggregative action found by the District Court. But instead of
attempting to factually measure as accurately as possible the
effects resulting from such a cause, and then tailoring the
remedy to correct these violations, the Court of Appeals
treated the case as if all of the racial separation and isolation
in Dayton had resulted from the "cumulative violation"
found by the District Court.
On appeal, the task of a Court of Appeals is defined with
relative ciarity; it is confined by law and precedent, just as
are th9se of the d!strict courts and of this Court. If it
concludes that the findings of the District Court are clearly
erroneous, it may reverse them under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
52 (b). If it decides that the District Court has misappre.hended the law, it may accept that court's findings of fact
but reverse its judgment because of legal errors. Here, however, as we conceive the situation, the Court of Appeals did
neither. It was vaguely dissatisfied with the limited character
of the remedy which the District Court had afforded plaintiffs,
and proceeded to institute a far more sweeping one of its
.own, without in any way upsetting the District Court's findIngs of fact or reversing its conclusions of law.
The Court of Appeals did not actually specify a remedy, but
did, in increasingly strong language, require that any plan
eliminate system-wide patterns of one-race schools predominant in the district. 518 F. 2d 853, 855. In the face of this
commandment, the .District Court, after twice being reversed,
observed.
"This court now reaches the reluctant conclusion that
there exists no feasible method of complying with the
mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit without the transportation of a substantial
number of students in the Dayton school system. Based
upon the plans of both the plaintiff and defendant the
assumption must be that the transportation of approxi-

.'
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mately 15,000 students on a regular and permanent basis
will be required."
We think that the District Court would have been insensitive
indeed to the nuances of the repeated reversals of its orders
by the Court of Appeals had it not reached this conclusion.
In effect, the Court of Appeals imposed a remedy which we
think is entirely out of proportion to the constitutional violations found by the District Court, taking those findings of
violations in the light most favorable to respondents.
This is not to say that the last word has been spoken as to
the correctness of the District Court's findings as to unconstitutionally segregated actions on the part of the petitioners.
As we have noted, ;;"pondents appealed from the initial decision and order of the District Court, asserting that additional violations should have been found by that court. The
Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to pass upon the respondents' contentions in its first decision, and respondents
have not cross-petitioned for certiorari from decision of the
Court of Appeals in this Court. Nonetheless, they are entitled under our precedents to urge any grounds which would
lend support to the judgment below, and we think that their
contentions of unconstitutionally segrega.tive actions, in addition to those found as fact by the District Court, fall into
this category. In view of the confusion at various stages in
this case, evident from the opinions both of the Court of
Appeals and the District Court, as to the applicable principles
and appropriate relief, the case must be remanded to the
District Court for the taking of additional evidence and the )
making of more specific findings.
If the only deficiency in the record before us was the failure
of the Court of Appeals to pass on respondents' assignments
of error respecting the initial rulings of the District Court,
it would be appropriate to remand the case to that court.
But we think it evident that supplementation of the record
will be necegy;;~~part from what has been said above with
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respect to the use of the ambiguous phrase "cumulative violation" by both courts, th~~rity between th~ evidence of
CO£§ti1(_utional violations and the sweeping remedy finally
decreed requires supplementation of the record and additional
findings addressed specifically to the scope of the remedy. It
is clear, in any event, that the presently mandated remedy
cannot stand upon .the b~s of the violations found by the
~ District Court ,The District d5urt, in the first instance, subject to reviewby the Court of Appeals, must mal<:e new findings and conclusions as to violations in the light of this opinion, W askington v. Davis, supra, and Village of Arlington Heights, supra.
It must then fashion a remedy in the light of the rule laid
down in Swann, supra, and elaborated upon in Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284 (1976). The power of the federa_ _..,
courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities "is not plenary. It 'may be exercised only on
the basis of a constitutional violation.' rMilliken V. Bradley]'
418 U. S., at 738, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U. S. 362, 377. Once a constitutional violation is found, a
federal court is required to tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to
fit 'the nature of the violation.' 418 U. S., at 744; Swann,
supra, at 16." Hills, supra, at 294.
The duty of both the District Court and of the Court of
Appeals in a case such as this, where mandatory segregation
by law of the races in the schools has long since ceased, is to
first determine whether there was any action in the conduct
of the business of the school board which was intended to,
and did in fact, discriminate against minority pupils, teachers
or staff. Washington v. Davis, supra. All parties should be
free to introduce such additional testimony and yther evidence
as the District Court may deem appropriate/ If such viola- V
tions are found, the District Court in the first instance, subject to review by the Court of Appeals, must determine how

A
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much incremental segregative effect these violations had on
the makeup of the Dayton school population as presently
constituted, when that population is compared to what it
would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may / ~
there be a systemwide remedy. Keyes, supra, at 213.
Z-We realize that this is a difficult task, and that it is much
easier for a reviewing court to fault ambiguous phrases such
as "cumulative violation" than it is for the finder of fact to
make the complex factual determinations in the first instance.
Nonetheless, that is what the Constitution and what our cases
call for, and that is what must be done in this case.
While we have found that the plan implicitly, if not explicitly, imposed by the Court of Appeals was erroneous on
the present state of the record, it is undisputed tha,t it has been
in effect in the Dayton school system during the present year
without creating serious problems. While a school board and
a school constituency which attempt to comply with a plan
to the best of their ability should not be penalized, we think
that the plan finally adopted by the District Court should
remain in effect for the coming school year subject to such
further orders of the District Court as it may find warranted
following the hearings mandated by this opinion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opmwn.

Y

It is so ordered.
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.:iu:prtntt Qf4tttri llf tlft 'Jhlttb .:itatts
-asfringhttt. ~. <!f. 2llp'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 31, 1977

Re:

No. 76-539

Dayton Board of ' Education v. Brinkman

Dear Lewis:
Herewith is a more up to date reaction on my part to
your memo of May 26.
I have actively had a chance to
incorporate several of your suggestions, and I attach a
printed draft reflecting them which will be circulated
later today.
In response to your paragraph 2, I have added footnote
1 setting forth the procedural history of the case.
I agree completely with the thrust of your paragraph
3, but upon reflection still think that the point is adequately made by the language beginning on the bottom of
p.6 and carrying over to p.7. Please let me know if you
have something different in mind.
I also agree, as suggested in paragraph 4, that the
draft was a bit sparse on quotation from the governing cases.
I have attempted to remedy that with a quote from Gautreaux
(in which the full Court joined) which incorporates dispositive language from Milliken and Swann. See p.l3.
Finally I think your rider proposed in paragraph 5 is
an improvement over my language, and I have incorporated
it verbatim with the exception of the last sentence which
is modified as per Potter's suggested change in the previous
draft.
See pp. 12-13.
Sincerely, ~

Mr. Justice Powell

~ltptclnt

QI.aurlqf t4t ~1nittb ~ta±t.s

JnaGlrhtgton. ~. C!f.
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

June 1, 1977

20gi'!~

.

RE: No. 76-539 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman
Dear Bi 11:
As you know, for some time it•s been my view in school desegregation
cases that we ought defer to dispositions concurred in by Districtcourts
and Courts of Appeals. Theirs is a very difficult task that I have come
to feel is deserving of the encouragement of our acceptance, unless they
have very obviously gone wrong. Because that•s my approach, J•m disturbed by the tone of your opinion. I think you are unnecessarily harsh,
particularly on the Court of Appeals. Moreover, your reading of the
opinions of both courts suggests that there was far less deliberate segregation than I think those courts could find has been imposed or encouraged
by the school board. I certainly think that the 11 cumulative violations 11
constitute more than 11 Very little 11 support for the remedial order. Surely,
at least they are cogent evidence of the school board•s deliberate discriminatory intent, and in that circumstance, actions more subtle than blatant and perhaps even inaction - would buttress a finding of purposeful discrimination systemwide sufficient to support the remedical order.

•'

In short, 1 1 11 try my hand at writing separately, although 1 1 d rather
not, and probably won•t if you can see your way to remove the chastizing
tone.
Sincerely,
'

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

';

June 1, 1977
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No. 76-539 Dayton Board v. Brinkman
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Dear Bill:
\'

Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:
\

The Conference

;.'

;f.
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.:§u:pumt <!Jtturt ttf t4t 'JE!ni:tdt .;§taus
~as4ittghm, ~. <!J. 2llc?J!.2

CHAM B E R S OF

..

.....·

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 1, 1977

Re:

.

.

No. 76-539 - Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman

,..

Dear Bill:
I join.
Sincerely,
.•.

·'

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference

..-·

..
>

,.
' ..

~

1,.•

.... - .

.,."t ..,,

.Suprtmt Qfllud ltf t~t ~b ~hrlts

'UJasJringtlln. ~. <!f.

2llpJ!~

CHAMeERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 1, 1977

Re: No. 76-539 - Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman

Dear Bill:
Please show me as not participating in the consideration
or decision of this case.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

.cc: The Conference

.;§upuutt <1J o-ttrl o-f tltt ~ttibb .§fili~

'Jllcu;frhtgto-tt, ]:9. QJ. zogm..;l
CHAMB E RS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

'

.,

/

'· I

June 2, 1977

Re:

No. 76-539 - Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman

Dear Bill:
If you would be willing to suggest language to
carry out the suggestions contained in your note of
June 1st, I would certainly give them careful consideration.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

•'

~.
I

•',

.§npr~nu

Qj:omt cf Ur~ ~niub .§hrlig

2J!frurlfittgtcn, lB. "f.

21TgtJ!..;l

CHAMB E RS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

·'
June 3, 1977

Re:

.. ·

.. , I

76-539 - Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman

Dear Bill:
On the whole, I think your opinion has handled
a rather delicate situation extremely well. However,
I did have a reaction somewhat comparable to Bill
Brennan's because I am also rather sensitive to the
problem of the District Judge on the firing line.
If
you make the changes, at least in substance, that he
has proposed, I will join the opinion.
I had one other sentence that troubled me that
I would like to me ntion purely as a suggestion.
It
is the last sentence in the first full paragraph on
page 12 beginning "In view of the confusion • • • . "
I tried my hand at a somewhat more moderate revision,
and frankly could not improve upon the sentence. However, I wonder if we want to require additional evide
to be taken in all events.
Perhaps it would be wise
to end by remand~rig ~to the District Court for the
making of more specific findings and, if necessary,
the taking of additional evidence."
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

·.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

·,
'

June 3, 1977

Re:

~':-.

76-539 - Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman

Dear Bill:
On the whole, I think your opinion has handled
a rather delicate situation extremely well. However,
I did have a reaction somewhat comparable to Bill
Brennan's because I am also rather sensitive to the
problem of the District Judge on the firing line.
If
you make the changes, at least in substance, that he
has proposed, I will join the opinion.
I had one other sentence that troubled me that
I would like to mention purely as a suggestion.
It
is the last sentence in the first full paragraph on
page 12 beginning "In view of the confusion . . . • "
I tried my hand at a somewhat more moderate revision,
and frankly could not improve upon the sentence. However, I wonder if we want to require additional evidence
to be taken in all events.
Perhaps it would be wiser
to end by re~and~rig ~to the District Court for the
making of more specific findings and, if necessary,
the taking of additional evidence."

: ~•,

Respectfully,

.;-

'

.

1'

"

~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

'

••

Copies to the Conference
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.:§u:p-umt {Q:cttrl d fltt ~ttit.cb ~faieg

'J)llr!Ullrmgttm. to. <q:. 2.a.?J.I.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

June 3, 1977

No. 76-539 - Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman

Dear Bill:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

jill j,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

j;tqtrtutt <.!fl!ttrlltf tlrt ~tb- $5nrug,

~agfringLm, ~. ~· 21lp't~. ·.'

...""

CHAMB ER S OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 6, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. 76-539

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman

Herewith my response to the suggestions of Bill and
John for changes in the presently circulating draft.
I am
most willing to accept two of your suggestions, Bill, but
feel I cannot accept the remaining ones without somewhat
altering the focus of the opinion.
I can fully accept your
suggestion, John, and will do so.
I will recirculate to
include the suggestions which I accept, unless I am advised
by someone who has already joined that such inclusion would
be objectionable.
I do not regard my acceptance of any of
the suggestions which I do accept as any sort of a quid pro
quo in return for which either of you are committed to join
the opinion.
Your suggested wording changes on p. 7 and on p. 11,
Bill, are entirely acceptable to me.
I cannot, however, go
along with the paragraph deletion on p. 11.
I thought that
one of the consensuses (if you will permit an anglicization
of a Latin fifth declension noun) was that much of what is
wrong in the present state of the case has been caused by the
court of appeals' misperception of its proper role in the
case, and the paragraph which you seek to delete attempts
to address that
problem.
,/
/

. I am not presently inclined to incorporate your first
suggested change on p. 13, Bill, not because I necessarily
disagree with it, but because it seems to me to contain
language which is not clarified or elsewhere addressed in
the opinion. The final suggestion on pp. 13-14 I am not

..

·'

\

•

2 '

..

.

'

\'\...

'\

willing to incorporate, since it replaces -what ·seem·s -· to me
to be a useful reference to the'relation of population
distribution and "segregation" with another repetition of
the more generalized "tailoring of the remedy to the violation"
language which appears throughout the opinion.
I agree fully with your proposed . revision of the last
sentence on the second full paragraph of p. , 12, John.
Sincerely,

:A/-~

•.t'

•.

·.

~llpttlttt

Qiltlttt llf f:4t ~b ;§taUs:
JD'astrmgtan. :!fJ. <!f. 21lc?''-l.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

June 6, 1977

RE: No. 76-539

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman

Dear Bi 11:
I very much appreciate your consideration of my suggestions
and fully understand why you'd prefer not to accept some of them.
In the circumstances I'll shortly circulate an opinion concurring
in the result. Needless to say nothing in your memorandum commits you to incorporate any of my suggested changes.
Sincerely,
I

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

'

,jnp-rtmc <!Jllttli ttf t4t 'Jjtttitc~ ~htftg
~l«fJ:rhtgfott.lO.

<!J.

ZO,?J!.$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 6, 1977

Re:

No. 76-539

-

/

Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman

Dear Bill:
I agree with the suggestion John has made in the second
paragraph of his letter of June 3 to you, and I hope it is possible
for you to make that change.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc:

The Conference

.iltJlTttttt Q}~ud ltf tqt ~tti:ttb .Statts.

Jfasfringhttt. ~. <q.

21lc?,.~

CHAMBERS 01'"

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

June 6, 1977

Re:

76-539

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman

Dear Bill:
I join either way.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

I

The Conference

j;u.p-rtmt tqcurt cf t~~ 'Ji-tnittb j;tl:lUg
2itas1ri:ttgtctt, gl. <.q. 2IT~J1~
C HA,.WERS OF

.J U ST I CE W I LLIAM H . REHNQU IST

J une 13, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. 76-539

Day-ton Board of Education v. Brinkman

I have this morning sent to the printer an additional
citation to be added on p. 13 of my opinion in this case.
At the end of the full paragraph on the page (after "Hills,
supra, at 294."), I am adding "See also Austin Independent
School District Vu United States,
U.So ____ ,
(1976) (Mr. Justice Powell, concurring)."
S incerely,
t/J.fl~

lfp/ss

1f)J~:;JJ.

6/18/77

¥
OARD OF EDUCATION v.
BRINKMAN
MR.JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In my concurring opinion Keyes v. School District,
___ U.S. ___ , ___ (1973), I urged abandonment of the de jure/
de facto distinction in desegregation as no longer ma
meaningful years after legislated segregated schools had
ceased to exist.

Although the Court persists in this

terminology, it is increasingly clear that the usage is
largely an historical iiKHxiBR fiction.

If a substantial

degree of segregation is found to exist in a school district,
this is viewed as sufficient to shift the burden of explanation
Xk to the school board.

It then becomes necessary forxk the

Board to BXi explain its decisions over past years with
respect to various aspects of school administration.
assignment politics, attendance

XBB

E.&.,

zones, locations and

closings of schools, adequacy and equality of facilities
and instruction, faculty employment, and the like.
Discriminatory intent by the school board is a
prerequisite to finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
But school boards rarely make a record of segregative
intent.

As I commented in Keyes, the Court simply inferred

·.

2.

intent where substantial segregation persists and where
the Board is not able satisfactorily to explain its action
or nonaction that could have affected

R -

i.e. contributed

to or perpetuated - the offending condition.

In this respect

desegregation cases differ substantially from many other
claims of racial discrimination.

Two recent decisions of

this Court illustrate this distinction.

In Washington v.

Davis, ___ U.S. ___ (1976), the question was whether a
particular test required of applicants for a police force
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan ,

This term, in
U.S. ___ (1977),

the i alleged siaBximtaaEtxaiaBEimaRBXBX discriminatory
state action was refusal to amend the Village's zoning code.
Where specific or EBmaxxpaE comparatively isolated state
action is involved - such as the employment of a particular
test or the taking of some legislative action - intent
usually can be established fromxk the surrounding facts
and circumstances.

Wheee , however , the conduct of an

ongoing body - such as a school board - involving actions
and BR nonactions extending over a period of years is
under scrutiny , prima facie intent usually can be

3.
determinted only from de facto conduct.
I write now, in this most summary form, merely to
record my continued adherence to the views expressed at
length in Keyes.

I have come to think, however, that the

distinction the courts continue to draw is of little
practical distinction where the subject of inquiry sixiX
is the conduct of itsasaiii affairs by a school board over
a period of years.

What it has done, or failed to do,

may be sufficient to create a prima facie case wholly
without& any regard to any proof of segregatory intent as
the term was originally used.
two
In other respects, the/decisions handed down today in Milliken v. Bradley, post , at ___ , and in this case the Court has had occasion to clarify some of the ambiguities
that many of our federal courts apparently perceived in
In doing

powers of an

~

4.
equity court are broad, remedies may not properly exceed
the extent of the constitutional violations*.

*Also , it is becoming more widely understood by the courts
as well as the educators that the principal causes of the
widespread school segregation found in the urban areas of
this country are the demographic - the socio-economic iRBi influences which have tended to concentrate our
minority citizens in the inner-city areas while the more
mobile white majority disperses to the suburbs . As I
made clear in Keles , attempts to impose a meausre of racial
balance in schoo s throughout an urbanized area by massive
transportation of children of all ages Bii often produces
greater segregation in the end with negative educational
consequences. Only slowly have we recognized the truth
of what Professor Bickel wrote some years ago:
(copy quote from Keyes) Bickel, The Supreme Court
and the idea of progress , n . 7, at 132 .

lfp/ss
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intent.

As I commented in Keyes, the Court simply inferred
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intent where substantial segregation persists and where
the Board is not able satisfactorily to explain its action
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length in Keyes.
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the Court has had occasion to clarify some of the ambiguities
that many of our federal courts
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perceived in

Swann v. Board of Education, 4o2 U.S. 1 (1971).

In doing

so, there has been no retreat from the basis commitment

kexxiaHa heralded in Brown I and II to
-

of state-imposed segregated education.
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Rather, the Swann

requirement that although the remedial powers of an

'·

4.
equity court are broad, remedies may not properly exceed
the extent of the constitutional violations*.

*Also, it is becoming more widely understood by the courts
as well as the educators that the principal causes of the
widespread school segregation found in the urban areas of
this country are the demographic - the socio-economic XHEX influences which have tended to concentrate our
minority citizens in the inner-city areas while the more
mobile white majority disperses to the suburbs. As I
made clear in Keyes, attempts to impose a meausre of racial
balance in schools throughout an urbanized area by massive
transportation of children of all ages s£f often produces
greater segregation in the end with negative educational
consequences. Only slowly have we recognized the truth
of what Professor Bickel wrote some years ago:
(copy quote from Keyes) Bickel, The Supreme Court
and the idea of progress, n. 7, at 132.
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